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Abstract—The possibility of programming the control and
data planes, enabled by the Software-Defined Networking (SDN)
paradigm, represents a fertile ground on top of which novel
operation and management mechanisms can be fully explored,
being Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack detection based
on machine learning techniques the focus of this work. To carry
out the detection, this paper proposes ORACLE: cOllaboRation
of dAta and Control pLanEs to detect DDoS attacks, an architec-
ture that promotes the coordination of control and data planes to
detect network attacks. As its first contribution, this architecture
delegates to the data plane the extraction and processing of
traffic information collected per flow. This is done in order to
ease the calculation and classification of the feature set used in
the attack detection, as the needed flow information is already
processed when it arrives at the control plane. Besides, as the
second contribution, this architecture breaks the limitations to
calculate some features that are not possible to implement in
a traditional OpenFlow-based environment. In the evaluation of
ORACLE, we obtained up to 96% of accuracy in the testing
phase, using a K-Nearest Neighbor model.
Index Terms—DDoS, Security, SDN, P4, Machine-Learning
I. INTRODUCTION
A DDoS attack is considered a powerful weapon against
Internet security due to its ability to bring down even the
largest websites by overloading servers’ resources [1]. In
turn, Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is an emerging
network paradigm that decouples the control and data planes
where the network control is logically centralized and pro-
grammable. Considering the different proposed DDoS detec-
tion approaches, several leverage the SDN advantages: global
network view and control plane programmability. Among
these mechanisms, those based on Machine Learning (ML)
algorithms are considered the best in terms of key metrics
such as detection speed, accuracy, and reliability [2], [3].
A traditional ML-based detection system is mainly based
on: i) a traffic information collecting mechanism, ii) a feature
calculation module, and iii) a classification model; all of them
implemented at the control plane. The collecting mechanism
obtains traffic information from the packets that arrive at
the SDN controller (Packet in) and also from the statistics
provided by OpenFlow (SDN southbound interface). The
feature calculation module processes the collected information
to build the set of descriptors, and, finally, the classification
module classifies this set of features in search of possible
ongoing DDoS attacks. However, in the implementation of
these detection systems, we observe two design challenges,
which we enumerate and describe next.
The first challenge is to prevent overloading the control
plane due to the execution of tasks related to polling infor-
mation from the network traffic, as well as the calculation
and classification of the feature set. To carry out these tasks,
the detection system has to store, update, and filter different
information samples, which are sorted and processed per flow,
connection, or source-destination pair. The execution of these
tasks in the presence of large amounts of packets and flows
can easily overload the control plane.
The second challenge lies in extracting, in real-time, the
information needed to calculate the feature set selected as
the best traffic descriptors. In an OpenFlow-based SDN en-
vironment, limited processing can be performed on a per-
packet basis at the data plane. The extraction of sufficient
traffic information with fine granularity needed to calculate
a wide variety of features in real-time becomes impractical.
Therefore, from a huge amount of traffic features proposed
in the literature, just a specific group of them (e.g., flow’s
byte/packet count and duration) are possible to implement.
In order to overcome these challenges, we propose ORA-
CLE, an approach based on the cOllaboRation of dAta and
Control pLanEs to detect DDoS attacks using the paradigm
of programmable data planes. The proposed approach fully
explores the programming of packet processing at a switch
level. To program the data plane, we use the P4 programming
language [4] together with the P4Runtime interface (to provide
communication with the control plane). At the data plane, we
propose a hash-based data structure to store customized per-
flow information. We also propose a mechanism to periodi-
cally report such information to the control plane, where the
feature set is subsequently calculated and classified per each
reported flow. The main contributions of ORACLE are:
• A novel strategy that is expected to be deployed over the
proposed SDN-P4 architecture to periodically calculate
specific flow features to be used by the detection system.
• An architecture that delegates to the data plane the
tasks of collecting, processing, and storing the required
information per traffic flow. This facilitates the calculation
and classification of the feature set by the control plane.
The architecture is not limited only to DDoS attacks. On
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the contrary, it provides the framework for the calculation
of any feature needed to detect other attacks.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
According to [5], for traffic classification, the list of po-
tential features is divided in five categories: packet level (e.g.,
packet length mean), flow level (e.g., average packet length and
packets per flow), connection level (e.g., advertised window
sizes), intra-flow level (e.g., features based on inter-arrival
times between packets of the same flow), and multiflow.
In order to extract information at the flow or intra-flow
level, three flow definitions apply [5]: unidirectional flow,
made up of packets sharing the same fields (source/destination
IP, source/destination TCP/UDP ports and transport protocol
number); bidirectional flow, made up of a pair of unidirectional
flows that are going in opposite directions between the same
source and destination IP addresses and ports; and full flow, a
bidirectional flow captured during its entire lifetime.
Recent research efforts indicate that SDN is suitable for
the implementation of sophisticated software solutions that
allow detecting DDoS attacks. The following proposals, im-
plemented at the control plane, make use of different feature
sets and ML-based detection techniques.
In [6], the authors perform the DDoS detection by polling,
each second, OpenFlow statistics per each unidirectional flow.
To calculate the feature set, they store several samples of the
same bidirectional flow (computed in the control plane from
the unidirectional flows) to calculate features based on average
and standard deviation (std) at flow level. Results show 96%
of accuracy with the Random Forest (RF) classifier.
The authors of [7] propose an integrated framework that
comprises two operational phases at the control plane: 1) a
lightweight processing phase that consists of monitoring the
flows looking for an entropy anomaly, and 2) a heavyweight
processing phase that is only invoked when an anomalous flow
is detected. The heavyweight process uses OpenFlow statistics
(packet count, byte count, duration) at flow level to detect
DDoS attacks. A Support Vector Machine (SVM) is used as
the ML-classifier providing a detection accuracy score of 88%.
This means that the reduction of heavy processes at the control
plane is achieved at big costs in terms of accuracy.
In the previous detection systems, and also in others such
as [8], we noticed that the implemented features are limited
to a specific group coming from header field values extracted
from the OpenFlow packet in event. In [9], we can find a wide
variety of features that one could implement to detect different
attacks (e.g., DDoS). Among the huge list of features, those
at the intra-flow level and several at the connection level are
not possible to calculate in an SDN/OpenFlow environment.
Consequently, we propose ORACLE, where the calculation of
such features is possible, in real-time, via the programming
and coordination of the data and control planes.
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Fig. 1. ORACLE system architecture
III. ORACLE: COLLABORATION OF DATA AND CONTROL
PLANES TO DETECT DDOS ATTACKS
A. Architecture
ORACLE is organized in two modules, namely Data Plane
and Control Plane, which we show in Fig. 1 and describe next.
Data Plane: ORACLE relies on a time window-based
implementation. During each window, the data plane performs
two tasks simultaneously: it i) collects new flow information,
and ii) reports flow information collected and processed in
the previous time window to the control plane. The data
plane’s module is composed of the following four components,
developed using P4 primitives such as registers, clone packet,
hash functions, and basic binary operations (+,-,*).
• Data Structure: It is used for the statistics organization,
management, and storage per unidirectional flow. To
access them, the flow identifier (flow-id) is mapped,
through a hash function, to the respective index (position
where the statistics are stored) in the data structure.
• Statistics Collector: In charge of extracting and pro-
cessing the needed information from the bit string of
every packet traversing the device. With this information,
the statistics of the flow associated with the packet are
updated.
• Pipeline Handler: In charge of controlling the time win-
dow duration and validating if the data structure contains
new flow information to report. If so, the incoming packet
is cloned and forwarded to the Information Transmitter
component along with the per-flow information that will
be subsequently sent to the controller.
• Information Transmitter: This component transforms the
cloned packet in a report packet that is forwarded to the
control plane using the P4Runtime interface. The cloned
packet is modified by eliminating its payload and adding
the flow information as a new custom header.
Control Plane: It is composed of an SDN controller and a
traffic classification component connected via REST-API. To
classify the reported flows, three components are involved:
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Fig. 2. Mechanism to store statistics per flow.
• Extract Flow Information: This component extracts the
custom header from the report packet and parses it to get
the information of every flow sent by the data plane.
• Feature Calculation: It builds a tuple with the features
set calculated with the flow information.
• Classifier: An already loaded ML model classifies every
tuple received in DDoS or Benign class. When a possible
attack is detected, an alarm is issued.
B. Data Plane Storage Mechanism
ORACLE collects and stores statistics of packets belonging
to each flow on the programmable switches. It guarantees that
flow statistics can be consulted and updated each time a new
packet belonging to the flow arrives to the P4 device.
We use P4 registers to define a data structure to store flow
statistics. A register is a fixed-size array that uses an index
to point to the stored elements. To consolidate the structure,
we use a set of such registers to build a matrix-like structure,
where each row stores values of the same statistics belonging
to different flows, and each column stores different statistics
of the same unidirectional flow (see Fig. 2). To designate a
unique index (column) to each unidirectional flow, we use
the hash function with an input value (Flow-Id) that consists
of source/destination IP, source/destination port, and transport
protocol. The hash’s output is the index mapped to the flow.
Figure 2 shows how per-flow statistics are stored and
updated by the Statistics Collector component. Once a packet
enters the P4 device, its bit string is parsed to extract and map
each header field value to P4 variables. From these variables,
the collector builds the 5-tuple (Flow-Id) to calculate the hash
function. Once having the flow index, the flow statistics are
updated in the data structure with the needed information that
is obtained by processing the P4 variables.
As we are working with bidirectional flows and the method
stores unidirectional flows, it is important to identify the pair
of flows (indexes) defining the bidirectional flow within the
data structure. To know the index of the opposite direction
of the flow, we calculate again the hash function exchanging
the order of the flow identifier fields (see Fig. 2). Hence, we
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Fig. 3. Lane-based mechanism to handle time windows and buffers.
define forward (FWD) as the direction of the first packet of
the flow and backward (BWD), the opposite direction.
C. Data Plane Flow Reporting Mechanism
The Pipeline Handler component is in charge of reporting
flow information to the control plane at the beginning of each
time window. In order to forward the information of all bi-
directional flows collected at the previous time window to the
control plane, it is necessary to know the indexes that point
to the specific flows within the data structure. To ease this
process, each time a new flow is instantiated at the statistics
data structure, both indexes (FWD and BWD) are stored in a
new data structure composed of two registers and a counter
(see Fig. 2). One register stores the indexes of the FWD
unidirectional flows, and the other stores the indexes of the
BWD flows. Hence, each column will contain the indexes
of a different bidirectional flow and the counter will be just
a reference to know the position of the last pair of stored
indexes. This data structure works like a LIFO buffer: indexes
are stored sequentially as the flows are instantiated. When the
information is to be sent to the control plane, the indexes are
consumed from the buffer in the reverse arrival order.
The implementation of the control data structure with a
single buffer implies that the data plane interrupts the process
of collecting information from new flows until the buffer is
emptied. As the system must be able to perform both tasks
(collecting and reporting flows to the control plane) simulta-
neously, we propose to abstract the idea of two independent
monitoring “lanes”, each one with its buffer. Therefore, is
possible to delegate, over a same time window, one task to
each lane, avoiding the process to be interrupted (see Fig. 3).
Using this strategy based on independent buffers to store the
indexes of bidirectional flows, the Pipeline Handler component
can validate, in each time window, if there are flow statistics
available to forward to the control plane. If so, this component
looks for per-flow statistics from the data structure, clones the
number of incoming packets needed to transmit this informa-
tion, and delegates the transmitting process to the respective
component. The Information Transmitter component embeds
the information of each flow into a custom header. The number
of fields (flows) within this header should be as big as the
network MTU value to avoid injecting too many report packets
into the network.
TABLE I
SELECTED FEATURE SET
# Feature name Description Level / Type
F1 FlowDuration Flow duration in microseconds Flow /
(Bidirectional)
F2 FlowIATStd Standard deviation of packet inter-arrival Intra-Flow /
times of the same flow. (Bidirectional)
F3 avgPacketSize Average of packet payload sizes of the Flow /
same flow. (Bidirectional)
F4 BwdPktLenStd Standard deviation of packet payload Intra-Flow /
sizes of the same flow in the backward (Unidirectional)
direction
IV. DETECTION SYSTEM IMPLEMENTED ON ORACLE
As proof of concept, we implemented a DDoS attack
detection system that uses the feature set listed in Table I.
These features are recommended in [9], where the authors
used the RandomForestRegressor technique to select, among
80 features, a small set considered the most adequate for
DDoS attack detection. This set is made up of two features
at flow level (F1 and F3) and two at intra-flow level (F2 and
F4). On the other hand, there are features that are calculated
considering the statistics in both flow directions (bidirectional),
and one of them (F4) considering only the BWD direction.
In Table I, F2, F3, and F4 are based on average (avg) and
standard deviations (std) operations, calculated using Eq. 1 and
2, respectively. xi corresponds to an information unit extracted
from packet i, which belongs to a group of n packets (of a
same flow). The meaning of xi changes depending on the
feature to calculate; for F2, it corresponds to the packet inter-
arrival time (IAT), and for F3-F4, it corresponds to the size in
bytes of the packet’s payload.
avg = x =
∑n
i:1 xi
n− 1 (1)
std =
√∑n
i:1 (xi − x)2
n− 1 =
√∑n
i:1 x
2
i − 2x
∑n
i:1 xi + nx
2
n− 1 (2)
In an SDN/OpenFlow environment, the features at flow level
(F1 and F3) can be calculated from OpenFlow statistics. The
real challenge is to calculate the intra-flow features (F2 and
F4) because: i) OpenFlow does not permit to know the packet
IAT, and ii) to calculate the std of an intra-flow measure, every
xi value is required at the control plane to subtract the mean
from it when the sum is being computed (see Eq. 2, left side).
ORACLE allows overcoming these limitations as it stores
individual information for each packet, even IAT values, and
reports it periodically to the control plane. However, this
may result in high latency and storage/processing resource
consumption. A more ambitious solution would be to calculate
these features directly on the data plane and avoid sending
every xi. This solution is not possible because programmable
data planes are usually limited in the available mathematical
operations (e.g., division and square root are not allowed).
Therefore, we propose the following alternative. The tradi-
tional std (Eq. 2) is transformed using arithmetic properties to
have the right side representation. Now, this new representation
TABLE II
INFORMATION PER-FLOW REPORTED BY THE DATA PLANE
# Feature / Statistic Description
F1 FlowDuration Flow duration in microseconds
S2 TotFwdPkt Total number of packets in the FWD direction
S3 TotBwdPkt Total number of packets in the BWD direction
S4 TotLenFwdPkt Aggregation of packets’ payload size in FWD
direction (
∑
xi)
S5 TotLenBwdPkt Aggregation of packets’ payload size in BWD
direction (
∑
xi)
S6 TotLenBwdPktSqrt Aggregation of packets’ payload size
square in BWD direction
(∑
x2i
)
S7 IATTotal Aggregation of the packet inter-arrival times
(
∑
xi)
S8 IATTotalSqrt Aggregation of the packet inter-arrival times
square
(∑
x2i
)
depends on two sums: the aggregation of values (
∑
xi), and
the aggregation of square values
(∑
x2i
)
. Using the data plane
mechanisms proposed in ORACLE, we calculate, directly at
the data plane, the result of both sums per each flow, as the on-
going packets traverse the data plane device. Therefore, when
these aggregation results are reported together with the packet
counters to the control plane (see Table II), the controller has
only to replace them in Eq. 1 and 2 to calculate F2, F3, and
F4 per each flow in an easy and fast way, as specified below.
Regarding F1, it is calculated directly in the data plane and
reported to the control plane together with the statistics.
• FlowIATStd (F2):
n = S2 + S3 (Bidir.) ; x =
S7
n− 1 (3)
std =
√
S8− 2 ∗ x ∗ S7 + nx2
n− 1 (4)
• avgPacketSize (F3):
n = S2 + S3 (Bidir.) ; x =
S4 + S5
n− 1 (5)
• BwdPktLenStd (F4):
n = S3 (Unidir.) ; x =
S5
n− 1 (6)
std =
√
S6− 2 ∗ x ∗ S5 + nx2
n− 1 (7)
V. EVALUATION
A. Experimental Setup and Methodology
We replicated the packet trace used in [9] over a real
scenario. This experiment consisted of a 20 minute-long DDoS
attack generated from different devices located in an external
network, trying to deny the service provided by a web service
located in the DMZ of a local network. This trace, which has
traffic captured for 90 minutes, is composed of 762,973 DDoS
packets and 1,382,900 benign packets, stored in a PCAP file.
Fig. 4 shows the implemented scenario. The data plane,
emulated using Mininet, consists of: i) a BMV2 virtual switch
with P4 support (in charge of executing the data plane strat-
egy); ii) a host responsible for reproducing the traffic trace
using the TCPReplay tool (representing the external network
where the DDoS attack is originated); and iii) a victim host
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Fig. 4. Experimental setup.
(Web Server), where all replicated traffic is forwarded to. In
turn, the control plane is composed by the ONOS controller,
which is connected to the BMV2 switch using the P4Runtime
interface. This plane has a classifier component, which loads a
previously trained ML-model. This scenario was implemented
on a Core i5 5200 computer, with 12 GB of RAM and the
Ubuntu 18.04 LTE operating system.
The implementation of our proposed system was exposed
to two different workloads, one for the training phase of the
ML model (WL1) and another for the testing phase of the
same model (WL2). To create both workloads, the pcap file
was divided into 18 sets of 5 minutes each, labeled from 1
to 18 considering their order in the trace. The sets with odd
numbering were put together to build WL1. Then, the sets
with even numbering were also joined to build WL2.
Before training the classification model, we had to build
a database containing flow information. To create it, an
ONOS application was developed to store, inside a .csv file,
the feature set, and the respective tag (class: “Benign”, or
“DDoS”) for every flow reported by the data plane (see Fig
4). These tags, needed to train the supervised model, were
obtained directly from the packets belonging to WL1. They
were previously marked (00: Benign, 11: DDoS) by modifying
the last two bits of the IPv4 ToS header field.
Besides focusing on training the best ML model to detect
DDoS attacks, we also decided to investigate how the detection
system could be affected by different time window values at
the data plane. For this assessment, we built a different training
dataset per each time window value. Table III shows the char-
acterization of the training datasets constructed considering
different time window values (5, 20, 40, and 60 seconds).
TABLE III
TRAINING DATASET CHARACTERIZATION
Dataset per Time Window Duration
Tag / Time Window 5 Sec 20 Sec 40 Sec 60 Sec
Benign Flows 61,736 40,462 31,894 29,670
DDoS Flows 49,012 45,688 44,511 43,255
Total Flows per Dataset 110,748 86,150 76,405 72,925
After creating the mentioned databases, the next step con-
sisted of training the ML models in an offline manner. We used
and compared two ML classifiers per each time window: RF
and K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) (8 models in total). To build
the models, we implemented cross-validation of 10 iterations
using the datasets shown in Table III. In each iteration, a grid
search was performed to find the best set of hyperparameter
values that lead to the most accurate models. After ten itera-
tions, the best model was chosen (among the ten evaluated).
In Table IV, we show the best set of hyperparameter values
with which it was possible to train the best model found for
each time window duration.
TABLE IV
BEST HYPERPARAMETERS / TRAINING TIME
Random Forest (RF)
- M1: 5 Sec M2: 20 Sec M3: 40 Sec M4: 60 Sec
Max depth 6 6 6 6
N estimators 300 500 500 300
Training time [S] 332.8 ± 6 304.4 ± 8.1 264.4 ± 20 272.6 ± 20
K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN)
- M5: 5 Sec M6: 20 Sec M7: 40 Sec M8: 60 Sec
# Neighbors 3 3 3 3
Training time [S] 59.8 ± 2 37.7 ± 1 36.3 ± 3 26.7 ± 1
In the testing phase, each model was pre-loaded into the
classifier component. Then, the WL2 was replicated eight
times per each model for the online evaluation. In these
experiments, all packets of WL2 were also tagged to compare
the tag of each flow with the classifier’s classification result
(in real-time). In this phase, both the feature set and the flow
tag were not stored. Instead, they were sent to the classifier
component.
The metrics used in the testing phase to evaluate the
detection performance are based on the number of true positive
(TP), true negative (TN), false positive (FP) and false negative
(FN) classes (DDoS and Benign) obtained during the experi-
ment. The metrics are introduced as follows:
• Accuracy is the number of correctly detected cases in the
total flow sample, considering both classes.
Accuracy = TN+TP
TN+TP+FP+FN
(8)
• Recall represents the proportion of DDoS samples cor-
rectly detected in relation to the total DDoS flow samples.
It is best known as the True Positive Rate (TPR).
Recall = TPR = TP
TP+FN
(9)
• Selectivity represents the proportion of Benign samples
correctly detected in relation to the total Benign flow
samples; also known as the True Negative Rate (TNR).
Selectivity = TNR = TN
TN+FP
(10)
• F1 Score can be seen as the weighted average of the
precision and recall metrics values.
F1 score = 2TP
2TP+FP+FN
(11)
B. Experimental Results
Table IV shows the average time to calculate the best set
of hyperparameters and train the model with them. We notice
that KNN is the best option when it comes to the performance
of the training phase, as it is faster than RF.
Fig. 5 shows the detection accuracy results as a function of
the time window duration (in the testing phase). It is possible
to observe that the eight models trained lead to an accuracy
higher than 93%, which is within the upper range seen in
the literature [6], [7]. Besides, the KNN accuracy results are
higher than the RF ones for all time windows. Nevertheless,
the difference between models does not exceed 1.2%.
Increasingly better results are obtained as the time window
duration increases, reaching the best values for time windows
of 60 seconds. We highlight here a vital trade-off between
accuracy and detection delay. A significant time window
duration might lead to an intolerably high latency to detect
and mitigate a DDoS attack. We advocate that as the detection
rates vary just slightly (1.1% for KNN and 1.7% for RF), one
should favor lower time window durations.
Table V shows the results obtained for the remaining
metrics. One can observe how accurate every model is in
classifying each class separately (Recall: “DDoS”, Selectivity:
“Benign”). Also, the F1 score shows the second indicator of
accuracy. Note that the main interest of the detection system is
to have a classification model very precisely classifying DDoS
(low FN) and, at the same time, presenting the least possible
number of false alarms (low FP). According to the metrics,
a higher Recall value represents a model more accurately
detecting DDoS, and a higher Selectivity value represents a
model with a lower number of false alarms (see Equations
9 and 10). According to that, the M1 model is the most
accurate in detecting DDoS attacks, with a Recall value of
98%. However, M1 has the lowest selectivity value, which
makes this model one of the least reliable, since the false alarm
rate would be higher than the other models. This analysis is
reflected in the low value of the F1 Score.
Aiming at a better trade-off among accuracy, false alarms,
and time window duration, we consider that M3 and M7,
both in the 40-second window, are the best models to use by
our detection system. These models have the closest Recall
and Selectivity values, which means a more balanced choice
concerning the mentioned optimization aspects.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented ORACLE, an architecture im-
plemented over an SDN/P4 environment that promotes the
cooperation of both the control and data planes to detect
network attacks using Machine Learning models. ORACLE
leverages data plane programmability to extract flow informa-
tion at a higher level of granularity. This results in a more
straightforward calculation and classification of the feature
set in the attack detection process. As proof of concept, we
implemented a DDoS detection system based on the computa-
tion of intra-flow level features, which cannot be implemented
in a traditional SDN/OpenFlow environment. Obtained results
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Fig. 5. Accuracy of the evaluated models as a function of window duration
TABLE V
COMPARISON OF METRIC RESULTS OBTAINED IN THE TESTING PHASE
Random Forest (RF)
T.W. / Metric Recall Selectivity F1 Score
M1: 5 seg. 0.982 ± 0.001 0.920 ± 0.003 0.934 ± 0.002
M2: 20 seg. 0.933 ± 0.005 0.939 ± 0.003 0.933 ± 0.003
M3: 40 seg. 0.957 ± 0.002 0.957 ± 0.003 0.952 ± 0.003
M4: 60 seg. 0.963 ± 0.003 0.941 ± 0.002 0.959 ± 0.002
K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN)
T.W. / Metric Recall Selectivity F1 Score
M5: 5 seg. 0.967 ± 0.002 0.935 ± 0.003 0.937 ± 0.003
M6: 20 seg. 0.951 ± 0.003 0.943 ± 0.004 0.945 ± 0.003
M7: 40 seg. 0.970 ± 0.003 0.967 ± 0.003 0.962 ± 0.002
M8: 60 seg. 0.970 ± 0.003 0.946 ± 0.003 0.964 ± 0.002
show that the detection system has an accuracy rate of up to
96% while reducing the processing complexity performed by
the controller. As future work, we envisage making ORACLE a
comprehensive detection system capable of detecting different
types of attacks.
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